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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al.
[Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2008. Vertical mergers and downstream spatial
competition with di¤erent product varieties. Economics Letters 101, 262264]. Specif-
ically, we prove that in the pre-merger case, Nash equilibrium locations are socially
optimal, whereas a vertical merger will relocate downstream rms by making them
move to the right of their socially optimal positions while keeping their in-between
distance intact.
JEL classication: L13, L42, D43, R32
Keywords: Price discrimination; Spatial competition; Merger
1 Introduction
In their paper Beladi et al. (2008) attempt to extend the results in Braid (2008) by evaluating
the equilibrium locations of two rms selling di¤erent varieties of a product following a
vertical merger. In a market with upstream monopoly, they claim that a vertical merger will
"exacerbate the distance of the downstream rms from the socially optimal location: the
rm outside the merger will deviate more than the rm that is part of the merger". The
precision of this result has been compromised by both technical and conceptual aws.
Specically, we prove:
(i) in the pre-merger case, the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, and
(ii) in the post-merger case, the downstream rms relocate by both moving to the right of
their socially optimal locations maintaining their relative distance intact.
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2 Results
The model is as in Beladi et al. (2008). To the end of facilitating the presentation we make
use of the exact same notation as in Beladi et al. (2008), with M the upstream monopolist
and R1 and R2 the two downstream competing rms. It is straightforward to see that absent
a merger the monopolist M is charging a uniform wholesale price w which being equal for
both rms a¤ects equally their delivered cost at location z [see Braid (2008), p. 345]. As a
result, w is cancelled out from the prot both rms have selling the common good (W ) to
the consumer located at place z. Therefore, their respective prot functions are
1 =

c(k   w)  ct
2
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x2 + (1  x)2
+
 Z x
0
b[t(y   x)]dz +
Z (x+y2 )
x
b[t(x+ y   2z)]dz
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and the Nash equilibrium locations are given by
(x; y) =

1
2
 R; 1
2
+R

(3)
where R = b
4(b+c)
. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Absent a merger, the Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream
rms, in a vertically related industry are socially optimal (1
2
R).
In case of a merger taking place between the upstream rmM and R1, the prot functions
2
of the downstream rms become
1 =

c(k)  ct
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with x+y
2
+ w2
2t
 y and w2 > w.1
Notice the di¤erence of equations (4) and (5) and the corresponding equations in Beladi
et al. (2008). The integration threshold s is the outcome of the comparison of the two
delivered costs for the common good W : t(y   s) + w2 = t(s  x)) s = x+y2 + w22t .
Solving (4) and (5) for x; y, we get the following Nash equilibrium locations
(x; y) =

1
2
 R + !; 1
2
+R + !

(6)
where ! = bw2
2t(b+2c)
. This leads to the next proposition
Proposition 2 When one of the downstream rms merges upstream, the Nash equilibrium
locations of the two downstream rms, in a vertically related industry, are

1
2
 R + bw2
2t(b+2c)

for the the integrated rm and

1
2
+R + bw2
2t(b+2c)

for the un-integrated rm.
One deduces from Propositions 1 and 2 that after the merger, both downstream rms
move to the right of their socially optimal locations. The intuition behind this result is that,
following the merger, the un-integrated rm having lost its competitive edge is forced to give
away part of its market share. It is remarkable, although perhaps natural, that the distance
1If x+y2 +
w2
2t > y, both rms are reduced to spatial-price discriminating monopolists where the pre-merger
common good W is now provided only by the integrated rm. It can easily be shown that in such case, both
rms will locate in the center (i.e., x = y = 1=2) replicating the equilibrium á la Hotelling (Hotelling, 1929).
We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case where x+y2 +
w2
2t  y.
3
between the two rms is 2R = b
2(b+c)
which means that the relocation of the two rms is
taking place with no e¤ect on their relative distance.
3 Conclusion
We have shown that the existence of an upstream monopolist will not a¤ect the social
optimality of the Nash equilibrium locations for the downstream rms. Moreover, in the
event of a vertical merger, compared to the pre-merger situation, the integrated rm will
move closer to the center, never exceeding it, while the un-integrated rm will move an equal
distance away.
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